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Abstract:  
The need for relational contracting in the construction industry is high because of the barriers 
arising from its highly fragmented nature. While relational contracting principles are less difficult to 
apply in private sector projects, it is not known if public sector projects can enjoy the full benefits 
of relational contracting. This paper aims to provide answers to this question. Difficulties of 
implementing relational contracting principles in public construction projects were firstly discussed. 
A theoretical framework including a basic model, an integrated stakeholder network, and three 
categories of measurement items were then identified. Although the theoretical framework and 
accompanying hypotheses are still required to be tested by a following survey, the proposed 
findings would guide the application of relational contracting in public projects, thus contributing to 
better relationships in the construction contracting environment, and thereby boosting project 
outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
The relationships between contracting parties in a construction project include formal liaisons and 
relational links. Formal contracts set out the rights, responsibilities and liabilities of the parties. But 
in a formal contract, contracting parties act in an atomized manner, looking out for their own 
interests (Williamson, 1975). Formal contracts do not support contractual incentives or flexibilities 
that are required in ever-changing construction scenarios, and in the face of uncertainty and 
complexity (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Barriers also arise from the highly fragmented 
industry and business nature, where there is dichotomy between design and construction. This lack 
of integration gives rise to adversarial relationships. The need for relational contracting in the 
construction industry is hence high. 
Relational contracting principles may be mobilized to offer contractual incentives/flexibilities, 
improve relationships among contracting parties, and lubricate any transactional frictions. 
Relational contracting is based on recognition of mutual benefits and win-win scenarios through 
more cooperative relationships between contracting parties, and underpins various approaches, such 
as partnering, alliance, joint venturing, long term contracting, joint risk sharing mechanisms and 
other collaborative working arrangements (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a). Relational 
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contracting allows mutual future planning and considers contracts to be relationships among the 
parties, in the process of projecting exchange into the future (Macneil, 1974). 
While relational contracting principles are less difficult to apply in private sector projects 
(Kumaraswamy, 2010), it is not known if public sector projects can enjoy the full benefits of 
relational contracting. This is because public clients are not in a position to offer any future 
relationships, since most projects must be procured through competitive bidding (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004b). Public clients also cannot be seen to have a ‗hand-in-glove‘ relationship 
with other contracting parties from the private sector, since this may imply cronyism. The possible 
side-effects of closer relationships include perceived break-down of carefully crafted contractual 
checks and balances, and dangers of sliding from partnering-type collaboration to corruption 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a). 
According to a survey by Construction Institute of ASCE, it was found that cost estimating is 
usually a much bigger problem in public construction than in private construction (Minchin et al., 
2010). The problem is that the lack of possible relational contracting approaches in public projects 
may have contributed to projects being completed above budget, behind schedule and to 
unacceptable level of quality. Yet, public projects are highly visible, and need to achieve the basic 
triple project goals because tax payers‘ money is involved. The knowledge gap in how public 
projects can capitalize upon and adopt relational contract principles is therefore seen. This paper 
directly address this issue by drawing heavily on ‗network‘ considerations in developing a 
conceptual framework for managing transactions in public sector construction projects. 
2 Features of Public Construction Projects 
Clients in public construction projects could be differentiated into clients who have a regular 
requirement for construction work and infrequent purchase clients. There are usually two ways to 
develop public projects. The first way such as in Beijing is that the client departments, who want to 
build their own office building for example, engage consultants and contractors to develop, design 
and construct the building by themselves. In this scenario, the client departments could be defined 
as ―one-off‖ clients. They may be ―on-off‖ clients who periodically build a new building. One-off 
or on-off clients would neither need nor be able to be experts in construction project management 
and develop future relationships with contractors and consultants. Another common way like in 
Hong Kong is that the client departments request the relevant work departments to design, call for 
tenders from private contractors to construct or to design and build the facility. In this case, the 
work departments could be defined as ―ongoing‖ clients, who have the construction project 
experience and will have future projects to be constructed. They may have less difficulty to offer 
future relationships with private contractors. Relational approaches may hence be possible with a 
long-term relationship founded on regular spending process (Tookey et al., 2001).  
Unlike private organizations, government organizations are strictly constrained by many rules and 
regulations. Even those public organizations that genuinely wish to change are often restricted by 
standing orders, public accountability and probity constraints (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 
2000; Chan et al., 2001; Minchin et al., 2010). These preset regulations restrict public officials in 
some activities and perpetuate a behavior pattern that militates against any kind of trusting 
relationships with other contracting parties. This pattern pushes both parties back toward a 
traditionally adversarial approach (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). For instance, the public 
sector has more stringent procedures to follow whenever variations or deviations from contracts 
occur (Chan et al., 2008). 
Organizational boundaries within government departments are typically rigid and impermeable. The 
departments have well-defined jurisdictions, responsibilities, and a hierarchy of authority. This 
traditional bureaucratic system of organizing must be overcome to allow public organizations to be 
partnered effectively (Crowley and Karim, 1995). There is also a lack of communication among 
such clients. Common knowledge sharing platforms (both internal and external) in public 
organizations are rare (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). This is especially critical in China 
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as the lack of appropriate mechanisms to inspire the different government departments to 
communicate actively has reduced the efficiency of project approval (Tai et al., 2009). 
Public sector is also burdened by a tedious stepwise decision-making system that often slows 
project delivery. Hence transforming industry enthusiasm into action for relational contracting in 
the case of public sector clients is not as easy as with private sector clients (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004a). 
The private companies had closer relationships with their suppliers than public clients. The public 
sector was not active to participate in appointing their own suppliers and left this entirely to the 
contractor, while by contrast, the private companies played a part in the appointment of their 
suppliers (Gibb and Isack, 2001). This could be explained by the organizational culture of public 
bodies. Public organizations are usually restrained by an inertia that may arise from beliefs such as 
‗that is not our responsibility‘ (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000).  
The bid behavior in public construction projects is usually under stricter legal regulations. Taking 
Hong Kong for example, competitive bidding is always required in a public project, while 
negotiation is more commonly adopted in the private sector (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). 
In theory, some common key procurement principles for public construction projects are public 
accountability, value for money, transparency (open, equitable and fair competition), 
propriety/integrity/probity, and confidentiality. Objectives considered in public sector construction 
contractor selections include proper delivery of good products and/services, minimization of risks 
and maximization of value for money (Palaneeswaran et al., 2003). However, in practice, public 
owners usually continue to select the same procurement route as they are in the habit of. They do 
not consider what procurement route suits each project best, and therefore they do not select the 
route according to best practice (Lædre et al., 2006). Furthermore, public clients are also restrained 
by beliefs like ‗there is no need to change current approaches/practices that are good enough (or 
even better than others)‘, or a ‗not invented here‘ syndrome (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 
2000). This limitation usually means that a well-performing contractor may not improve its chances 
of winning the next contract, even with the same public client (Weston and Gibson, 1993).  
To sum up, the issues discussed above may be considered as difficulties to successful 
implementation of relational contracting in public construction projects as presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Difficulties of implementing relational contracting in public construction projects 
3 In Search of a Paradigm 
3.1 Pragmatic Paradigm in Practice 
Following the increasing complexities of construction projects, there has been a range of initiatives 
across many countries to introduce an intensive self-examination and widely publicized reform 
agenda to the construction process in order to improve performance. Initiatives towards deeper 
collaboration have played a central role in complex projects, such as the UK ―Continuous 
Improvement‖ programme (Kumaraswamy et al., 2010) and Australia Alliance Contracting (Clifton 
et al., 2004). However, there have been improvements, yet these seem not to have been continuous 
(Anvuur et al., 2011). Taking the UK ‗Continuous Improvement‘ programme as example, the 30 
percent overall project savings targeted by Egan (1998) have yet to materialize and initiatives have 
Lack of PM skills 
Culture clashes 
Legal constraints 
Rigid procurement route 
Data inadequacies 
Internal boundary 
Difficulties 
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tended to be project-specific (Smyth, 2010). Therefore, this again reinforces the importance of this 
research. 
3.2 Theoretical Underpinning 
There are some companies in the construction industry that attempt to maximize their economic 
profit. They may be keen in participating in public construction projects with the intention of 
increasing the revenue. They usually prefer to adopt formal contracts, which contain fairly explicit 
stipulations of proscribed and prescribed behaviors. Contracting parties in a formal contract are 
adversarial in nature. This type of organizational strategy choice is therefore governed by rational 
choice theory (Becker, 1976). The basic idea behind rational choice theory is that people do their 
best under prevailing circumstances (Green and Shapiro, 1996). It therefore usually represents 
preferences with a utility function and seeks for the utility maximization. Rational choice theory 
presumes that the individual decision maker‘s interest is known and that he/she pursues his/her 
interests rationally (Becker, 1976). Williamson (1975) stated that in a relatively pure market, parties 
engage in transactions with minimum interdependence and little expectation for future interaction. 
The market is operated by ‗economic men‘ who exhibit self-interested behavior, are rational, and 
are affected minimally by social relations. These ‗economic men‘ make rational choices in 
transactions involving formal contracts. They rely on institutional arrangement to guard against 
trouble, select who to transact with based on pure economic motives, ignoring the identity of and 
past relationships with the individual actor. 
However, risk in a construction project is inherent and difficult to deal with. It is difficult for the 
partners to completely predict the potential problems and outcomes, and have all essential 
information. The basic assumptions of expected utility maximization under conditions of 
uncertainty are especially problematic (Machina, 1987). Contracting parties may also be mutually 
suspicious of each other as each pursues its profit maximization goal. Instead, Granovetter (1985) 
argued that most behaviors are closely embedded in networks of social relations. Non-rational 
behavior will be thereafter quite sensible when situational constrains, especially those of 
embeddedness, are fully appreciated. It is then noted that the decision making aims not only at 
economic goals but also at sociability, approval, status and power, which however are rarely seen as 
rational by economists (Hirschman, 1977). In other words, the objective of the behaviors is 
therefore not only to maximize utility but also to take into account other social goals (Granovetter, 
1985).  
Jones et al. (1997) proposed that four conditions promote embeddedness among parties: demand 
uncertainty with stable supply, complex tasks under time pressure, customized exchanges high in 
human asset specificity, and frequent exchanges among parties embedded in the network. 
Construction projects are always characterized by high risks, complex tasks, tight schedule, and 
long period. It is understandable that participators in the contractual structure of a construction 
project are usually closely embedded in a social network of relations. There is hence a possible 
governance mechanism among construction firms and the government embedded in a network. 
The Relational Contract Theory was originally developed by Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980, 1983). 
The theory states that informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct exist among contracting 
partners, and these are sustained by the value of future relationships (Macneil, 1978). It allows 
mutual future planning and considers contracts to be relationships among the parties, in the process 
of projecting exchange into the future (Macneil, 1974). Macneil (1983) summarized ten common 
contract behavior norms: (1) role integrity; (2) reciprocity; (3) implementation of planning; (4) 
effectuation of consent; (5) flexibility; (6) contractual solidarity; (7) the restitution, reliance and 
expectation interests; (8) creation and restraint of power; (9) proprietary of means; and (10) 
harmonization of the social matrix. Norms applicable to the ends of the relational/discrete behaviors 
are not simple mirror images. It is worth noting that contractual relationship is not absolutely 
relational or completely discrete, but exists on a spectrum, which ranges from relational to discrete. 
Moving a contractual spectrum ranging from relational to discrete does not just give greater or less 
emphasis to some of the norms, but also transform them (Macneil, 1983; Blois, 2002). The five 
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norms of enhanced importance in ongoing contractual relations are role integrity, preservation of the 
relation, harmonization of relational conflict, propriety of means, and supracontract norms. 
4 Relational Contracting Framework for Managing Public Projects 
Two arguments can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. Firstly, public bodies should be 
differentiated from private companies due to the identified issues presented in Figure 1. Secondly, 
the two variations in strategic focus will reflect the variations in contracting pattern, i.e. pursuing 
economic profit only leading to formal contracts and pursuing the balance of economic and social 
goals leading to relational contracts. 
4.1 Network Considerations 
In light of the first argument, Figure 2 therefore illustrates how typically multifarious stakeholders 
in a public construction project need to be integrated. The client body/department/organisation that 
commissions the built facility and other relevant functional departments like financial department, 
legislative department, and consulting department are considered in one network; while private 
contractor, sub-contractors, consultants and suppliers would form another network. 
 
Figure 2: Integrated stakeholders in public construction projects 
 
It is more appropriate to develop two separate networks so that the client department could avoid 
providing a mistaken impression of having a ―hand-in-glove‖ relationship with private companies. 
In cities with adequate public accountability and transparency, the difference between relational 
contracting behaviors and cronyism/corruption is obvious. However, in those cities where public 
accountability and transparency are not apparent, resistance from the public to adopt relational 
contracting principles may be encountered. 
In addition, one-off or on-off client departments are considered to have less project management 
knowledge and experience. They therefore need help of other members in the public network, 
especially the consulting department, to learn about the capability and past performance of bidders 
in order to choose a reputed contractor. Taking Hong Kong for example, a qualification certificate 
system is usually adopted in public construction projects such as the List of Approved Contractors 
for Public Works and the List of Approved Suppliers of Materials and Specialist Contractors for 
Public Works. In Singapore, the Building and Construction Authority also has a system to register 
contractors to undertake public works. This is in addition to licensing contractors to undertake large 
and complex projects. Given the rich project experience of on-going client departments, they can 
procure the project via competitive bidding and choose any appropriate private partner so as to 
introduce competition and prevent the ―egg-chicken‖ problem (i.e. a new contractor needs to 
complete more projects to be reputed but needs to be reputed first to win a contract).  
Private Network Public Network 
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4.2 Basic Model 
Based on the second argument, it is expected that the strategic focus will reflect the organizational 
governance and hence the project performance. Here organizational strategy refers to an attempt for 
pursuing solely economic goal or a balance between economic and social goals. Pursuing economic 
profit only (that is interpreted by rational choice theory) would lead to formal contracts, while 
pursuing the balance of economic and social goals (that is interpreted by network embeddedness 
theory) would lead to relational contracts. 
In addition, existing literature suggests a positive relationship between organizational culture and 
project performance (Denison, 1990; Zheng et al., 2010). Organizational culture refers to shared 
assumptions, values, and norms (Schein, 1985), which are held consistently and enable the 
organization to have the ability to alter behavior, structures, and systems in order to survive in the 
wake of environmental changes (Denison and Mishra, 1995). This study focuses on a narrower 
concept of organizational culture on relationship. 
To summarize, Figure 3 presents the basic model. To limit the scope of this research, organizational 
strategy and culture are both studied from the issue of relationship only. 
 
 
Figure 3: Basic theoretical model 
 
It is worth noting that the objective of public clients in public projects is always not to pursue a 
maximum economic profit, but instead a maximum value for money towards a balance of multi 
dimensions. Therefore, ―Strategy on relationship‖ is not a variable to public clients and hence is 
presented in dashed lines, which means it is only a variable to private construction organizations. 
More specifically, it is envisaged that:  
Hypothesis 1: Private organizations supplying goods/services in public projects that strive towards a 
relational contracting strategy will achieve better performance than those that pursue economic 
profit only. 
Hypothesis 2: Construction organizations that hold a culture more towards relational contracting 
behavior will achieve better performance than those that hold a less relational culture. 
In the proposed basic model, variables ―Strategy on Relationship‖ and ―Culture on Relationship‖ 
are both at organizational level, which are in need of a long period to establish. ―Governance 
Framework‖ is a project-based variable, which includes many other specific constructs like trust 
and communication and will be further explained in the following section. 
4.3 Relational Governance Constructs 
To develop a relational governance framework, a literature review is required to identify the 
elements and success factors of relational contracting approaches, which will be integrated to form 
relational governance constructs together with the five contract norms of relational contract theory 
(i.e. role integrity, preservation of the relation, harmonization of relational conflict, propriety of 
Legend 
         applicable to both public and private organizations 
         applicable to only private organizations 
Culture on 
Relationship 
Strategy on 
Relationship 
Governance 
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means, and supracontract norms). Based on the (precedent and subsequent) relationships among 
constructs, a preliminary governance framework could be thereafter derived.  
Measure items relating to success factors and elements of relational contracting approach were 
identified and presented in Table 1. It is worth noting that these items are divided into three 
categories, i.e. practices by each contracting party, practices between two of contracting parties, and 
practices among contracting parties. This means of classification provides the possibility to evaluate 
the practices by different parties and to develop the public and private networks if necessary. 
1371 
Table 1: Measure items under three categories 
Category Measure Items 
Practices by each 
contracting party 
Level of innovation/creativity 
Commitment of resources to the project 
Effort in implementing relational contracting practices 
Acceptance of relational contracting practices 
Culture fit to relational contracting practices 
Financial capacity 
Flexibility when situations change 
Knowledge level about project processes 
Long term commitment level to other parties 
Previous experience in relational contracting approaches 
Readiness to compromise on unclear issues 
Reputation in the industry 
Specific inputs on construction methods, materials, etc before they are formally appointed 
Team working attitude 
Top management support for relational contracting practices 
Attitude to continuous improvement 
Practices between 
two of contracting 
parties 
Familiarity/previous relationships  
Mutual trust  
Mutual understanding  
Open and effective communication  
Level of inter-personal relations/cultural harmony (individual level)  
Sharing of project information  
Ongoing social relationship (eg. ―guanxi‖, social ties and kinship outside of this project)  
Level of reciprocation/face-saving gesture  
Practices among 
contracting parties 
Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting parties 
Acceptance of performance appraisal mechanism for the project 
Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties 
Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person from each major party 
Joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting parties 
Clearly defined equitable risk sharing arrangement among contracting parties 
Flexible/adjustable contracts to address uncertainties 
Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem solving 
Presence of conducive learning climate/environment 
Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project 
Clarity of contract conditions (eg. scope of contract, duties & responsibilities) 
Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties 
Effectiveness of team building events used in the project 
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A questionnaire survey will be conducted, as the second stage of this research, to request public 
clients, private consultants and contractors to rate the extent to which each of the measure items in 
Table 1 were present, observed, practiced or emphasized in a past project. Respondents will be 
request to answer the questions based on one specific completed public construction project which 
they have been involved in. The questionnaire will include three main parts: i.e. background of the 
selected project, extent of the activities in the selected project, drivers and obstacles in the selected 
projects. 
The respondents will also be requested to evaluate the performance of the project. The data 
collected will be analyzed to test the basic model, to identify relational contracting constructs with 
strong impact on the project outcomes, and then to develop the preliminary governance framework. 
Following the questionnaire survey, the research will validate the theoretical framework and 
elaborate on the findings by conducting case studies. 
The survey will be conducted in the following cities: Singapore, Beijing, Hong Kong and Sydney. 
As the funding comes from MOE, Singapore is the natural choice to study. Singapore developers, 
contractors and consultants are predominantly Chinese by race. How Singapore-Chinese carry out 
relational transactions will be investigated. To move the study beyond Chinese Singaporeans so that 
the findings have more international application, this study proposes to investigate how indigenous 
China-Chinese undertake relational transactions. The research will focus on the capital city, Beijing 
(as it has a significant number of completed public projects after the recent Olympics).  
Recognizing that Beijing is not truly representative of China, Hong Kong is chosen to contrast 
contract practices in the capital and a SAR. To check whether the findings are unique to Chinese 
when compared to western practices, study will be conducted in Sydney to contrast the findings 
obtained from Singapore and China. Sydney is chosen because it adopts western project 
management practices. In addition, more Singapore firms are likely to benefit from an Australian 
finding as they may also export their services to Australia, and less likely to export their services to 
UK and US. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
It is found that contractual relationship is not absolutely relational or completely discrete, but exists 
on a spectrum, which ranges from relational to discrete. The search for a pragmatic paradigm such 
as project alliance framework in Australia (which although didn‘t bring in continuous improvements 
yet) indicates that relational contracting principles are also applicable to public construction 
projects. There is hence a possible governance mechanism among construction firms and the 
government in a public construction project. A theoretical framework including a basic model, an 
integrated stakeholder network, and three categories of measurement items were identified in this 
paper. The framework will be subsequently tested by the fieldwork using a structured questionnaire 
survey to ascertain its relevance to boost public construction project outcomes. 
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